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Abstract 
 
Shiwakoti et al. (2008) concluded that four of the largest UK mutual societies which 
converted to listed bank status in 1997 outperformed, on a variety of measures, those 
societies which did not convert in the four-year periods both before and after 
conversion. All four converting societies have since been subject to ownership 
change, suggesting that this out-performance failed to persist, or was perhaps illusory.  
We do not criticise the results obtained by the authors, but suggest that they leave 
unanswered important questions, such as how to measure ‘superior’ performance and 
the appropriate time frame over which to evaluate this. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In one of several linked papers on UK mutual building societies, Shiwakoti et 
al (2008, hereafter SKH) investigated the performance of UK mutual building 
societies and stock retail banks in the period 1993-2000, which covers four years 
before and four years after the conversion of four of the largest societies to banks  
listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1997.  SKH concluded that these societies 
(hereafter ‘the converting societies’) outperformed those societies which did not 
convert (hereafter ‘the continuing societies’) in both pre- and post-conversion periods 
on a variety of measures.  This is a striking conclusion, as all four converting societies 
have since been subject to ownership change, suggesting that this out-performance 
failed to persist, or was perhaps illusory. 
 
 We do not attempt to present a full assessment of the building society sector in 
this comment, but we suggest that SKH’s analysis, although welcome, suffers from 
significant shortcomings.  We do not criticise the results obtained by the authors, but 
we raise issues over the methodology used and interpretations of the results.  We 
therefore suggest that SKH’s findings leave unanswered important questions, such as 
how to measure ‘superior’ performance and the appropriate time horizon over which 
to evaluate corporate performance. 
 
 The measurement of long-term business performance is undoubtedly difficult.  
Financial crisis has shaken the existing order in the financial sector and market 
conditions have changed dramatically since the article was accepted and published. Of 
SKH’s sample, most of the 40 continuing societies (SKH, pp. 335-336) still exist as 
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independent entities, but all of the four converting societies have been subject to 
ownership change (see Table 1).  While successful performance may be defined in 
different ways, such a fate does not seem one of these. [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 The remainder of our commentary is structured as follows.  We next discuss 
demutualization, mergers among building societies and comment on the impact of the 
current financial crisis.  We then consider SKH’s performance measurement and their 
interpretations.  Finally we draw conclusions. 
 
2. Building societies, demutualization, mergers and financial crisis 
 
 In the current financial crisis mutual building societies seem to be viewed with 
a certain nostalgia and mutuality is suggested as a model for financial institutions 
going forward.  In this comment we do not argue for the theoretical superiority of any 
particular organizational form, and analysis of the mutual form reveals both 
advantages and disadvantages (SKH, pp. 320-322).  Whether these translate into 
‘superior’ performance, however measured, is an empirical question and studies such 
as SKH are therefore important and welcome.  Inevitably, the results of the analysis 
will be sensitive to the selection of time period and performance variables.  Before we 
review SKH’s analysis we consider demutualization in the UK building society sector. 
 
 We do not argue that demutualizations cannot produce gains for the 
organizations themselves or their members.  The arguments are well-rehearsed, and 
although SKH’s analysis tells us nothing about the position of the members of 
converting or continuing societies, this is not their objective.  Demutualization 
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unlocked value for members by giving them free shares.  This provided a means of 
selling their ownership rights, thereby crystallizing the otherwise intangible value of 
membership through their ability to trade shares and receive dividends.  Many 
societies attracted ‘carpet-baggers’ who became members in anticipation of these 
potential benefits of demutualization.  But members of continuing societies may have 
benefited from preferential terms offered by their societies.  A full analysis of the 
relative gains from membership of the converting and continuing societies has yet to 
be carried out and would need to include a comparison of potential returns to 
shareholders in converting societies and the potential benefits to the members of 
continuing societies could have enjoyed as investors and/or borrowers. 
 
 In SKH’s account, demutualization of building societies can be explained in 
terms of the inability of these institutions to grow further within their sector, including 
constraints on management recruitment and remuneration arising from societies’ 
traditional reliance on internal labour markets.  Effectively the large converting 
societies had outgrown the movement, and anticipated demutualization by beginning 
to adapt before this took place.  But whilst different from other societies, and 
apparently prepared for proprietary status, their subsequent failure to secure long-term 
survival suggests an inability to adjust fully to their new status.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Shiwakoti, Ashton and Keasey (2004) (SAK), who demonstrate 
that higher executive remuneration in converting societies did not reflect superior 
performance (on a more limited range of measures than used in SKH).  With 
hindsight, demutualizations allowed managers to gain greater control over both sides 
of the balance sheet and this created opportunities for growth which translated into 
higher remuneration.  Growth opportunities for financing owner-occupation, the main 
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lending activity of building societies, were limited, and other forms of lending, such as 
buy-to-let and commercial lending, offered better growth opportunities as the 
economic cycle became more favourable. 
 
 There is an extensive literature on mergers and economies of scale among 
building societies (summarized by Drake, 2003, pp. 310-313; also see, for example, 
Haynes and Thompson, 1999, pp. 833-834).  Drake (2003, p. 314) finds that 
economies of scale in larger societies had not been exhausted by the time the 
converting societies demutualized.  There therefore remained potential gains from 
organic growth or participation in mergers involving such  societies.  So why did the 
converting societies choose to convert, rather than try to reap such gains, as the largest 
continuing society, Nationwide, appears to have done?  SAK may have provided the 
answer (higher remuneration) and it is possible that the converting societies may have 
performed better in at least some respects if they had chosen not to convert but 
pursued alternative strategies.  But mergers between mutual organizations face many 
of the same difficulties as combinations among non-mutuals, and in particular 
incumbent managers may represent a formidable barrier to hostile takeovers. 
 
 We have noted the demise of the converting societies, but we also observe that 
continuing societies have experienced significant difficulties during the current 
financial crisis.  Some societies suffered losses through placing deposits with 
Icelandic banks, several appear to have been imprudent in commercial property 
lending, and all have been obliged to make additional contributions to the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme to compensate depositors in failed banks (KPMG, 
2009).  This has revived a long tradition of an implicit guarantee within the building 
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societies movement for larger societies to merge with smaller financially weak 
societies in ‘rescue mergers’ (see Thompson, 1997, for a discussion of merger 
motives).  Consolidation within the building society movement has continued since 
2000 and at the time of writing the number of societies had fallen below 50 with the 
prospect of further mergers.  In the post-crisis consolidation the largest society, 
Nationwide, has absorbed several smaller societies - the Cheshire, Barnsley, and 
Dunfermline societies.  Britannia has merged with Co-operative Financial Services to 
create a ‘super-mutual’, a merger between the societies ranked second and third in 
size, Yorkshire and Chelsea, is proceeding, and mergers of smaller societies have 
taken place (KPMG, 2009). 
 
 We also note in passing that SKH consider demutualization in British building 
societies in isolation from other mutual experiences, including those of other Anglo-
Saxon countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, where demutualization of 
significant financial institutions took place during a similar period and perhaps as fast 
as in the UK.  Elsewhere, there are barriers to demutualization such as shared assets or 
a central clearing house or central provider of services (for example, among the 
Spanish savings bank and Rabobank in the Netherlands).  We acknowledge that these 
experiences are outside the scope of SKH, but suggest that demutualization is a 
complex phenomenon. 
 
3.  Performance measurement 
 
 7
 In this section we suggest three areas in which we believe SKH’s analysis 
suffers shortcomings: the choice of risk measures; the time period; and the sample of 
societies covered. 
 
3.1 Risk  
 
 Is it possible that increased risk contributed to the loss of independence of the 
converting societies, and, if so, why was this not reflected in SKH’s results?   There 
are two possibilities: either the chosen risk variables failed to capture important 
aspects of risk; and/or risk did not increase until after the period of study.  We now 
address the first of these points and consider the second in the next sub-section. 
 
 SKH’s risk ratios fell in both sub-periods (1993-96, 1997-2000) for both 
converting and continuing societies and there were higher levels of risk in the 
converting societies in both sub-periods (SKH, p. 326).  The second finding is 
unsurprising - the converting societies were larger, faster-growing and diversification 
allowed them to take on more risk and the desire to grow rapidly would have 
encouraged them to do so.  SKH (p. 331) argue that ‘risk taking should increase 
following the conversion from mutual to plc status’, yet on these measures it falls.  
But the two chosen risk measures, the ratios of loan loss reserves and provisions for 
loan losses to total assets, are both lagging indicators of credit risk.  Risk should have 
increased as the converting societies moved (further) into business areas such as 
commercial lending in which they had less experience and lower quality security may 
have been available.  In the absence of superior skills, converting societies were 
presumably likely to acquire more marginal borrowers.  SKH (p. 331) suggest caution 
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and attribute the improvement in the risk ratios to falls in loan losses in the 1990s as 
the economy emerged from recession.  This immediately raises the question of the 
extent to which the chosen risk measures capture a cyclical effect and are not 
attributable to the behaviour of the institutions. 
 
 We suggest that a wider range of measures is necessary for a more thorough 
assessment of risk.  SKH treat growth in assets as a positive indicator of performance.  
We suggest that it could just as easily be considered a leading indicator of risk, as 
institutions growing more rapidly than the industry average would presumably acquire 
lower quality assets at the margin.  We acknowledge that the more rapid growth of 
converting societies could be attributed to superior management skills, or the ability to 
exploit economies of scale (although differences in growth rates between the 
converting and continuing societies virtually disappeared post-conversion: SKH, p. 
325).  It is also possible that greater risks were taken in order to drive growth - risks 
which ultimately were either misjudged or ignored and are not reflected in SKH’s 
analysis.  The reliance on wholesale funding of some converting societies to drive 
balance sheet growth has become evident in the financial crisis and we note that SKH 
do not include any liquidity measures in their analysis.  Schrand and Unal (1998), for 
example, suggest that a simple measure of risk in institutions converting from mutual 
to stock ownership is unlikely to capture total firm risk, given the complex dimensions 
of risk faced by financial institutions.  Converting institutions may choose, for 
example, to make greater use of derivatives to manage interest rate risk, which allows 
them to absorb increases in other risk measures. 
 
3.2 Time period 
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 We suggest that it would have been preferable to present results over various 
periods to see whether they are sensitive to the choice of period.  SKH consider a 
period of eight years, of which four are pre- and four post-demutualization.  They do 
not provide an explicit justification for their choice of time period and one can 
question the choice of both start and end points and the length of period.  Why not 
take a longer period, such as a total of 10 or 15 years?  We do not imply that the 
period was deliberately chosen to produce particular results, merely that the 
appropriateness of any particular period is unclear.  In fact, SKH’s end point is not 
arbitrary - there is a good reason for limiting the post-conversion analysis to four 
years, as it is after 2000 that the converting societies begin to disappear as independent 
institutions.  Thus the chosen end point could represent a clear step change in the 
adaptation to life as listed banks. 
 
 SKH offer no explicit justification for the starting point, although it could 
reflect structural or strategic change within larger societies.  An implicit reason for 
selecting 1993 as a starting point is that this is the end point for the analyses by 
Haynes and  Thompson (1999), Thompson (1997) and Valnek (1999). But there is 
every likelihood that the divergence between converting and continuing societies 
began before 1993 - the Building Societies Act was passed in 1986 and the Abbey 
National was the first society to demutualize in 1989.  1986 and 1989 would both 
therefore appear obvious starting points for analysis, and one could argue for an earlier 
date on the grounds that the largest societies which eventually demutualized would 
have anticipated the legislative change before it actually took place. 
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3.3 Basis of sample 
 
 We question whether SKH’s sample offers an appropriate basis for the 
performance evaluation they undertake.  We would argue that some of SKH’s 
measures should not be used to compare converting and continuing societies at all.  
SKH (p. 331) find superior performance on profitability measures for the converting 
societies, but claims for the superiority of mutuality are not founded on higher 
profitability.  Indeed, in preparing for conversion it would be remarkable if the 
converting societies did not show superior profitability.  Unfortunately, the obvious 
counter-factual - to examine continuing societies with similar characteristics to those 
converting - is not available. 
 
 SKH ignore 27 of the continuing societies on the grounds that due to their 
small size they cannot be reasonably compared to the converting societies (SKH, p. 
323, footnote 1).  If one accepts this argument, then why compare the 20 or so 
continuing societies with assets of less than £1 billion to the converting societies, the 
assets of the smallest of which were more than 20 times this (SKH, pp. 335-336)?  
This seems an entirely arbitrary decision. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 Demutualization raises many interesting questions.  We do not suggest that it 
is easy to conduct the type of analysis undertaken by SKH and it cannot answer some 
of the most interesting questions, such as why some societies chose to demutualize 
and others did not, and the timing of such decisions.  But other questions, such as at 
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what point do the performances of converting and continuing societies start to diverge, 
could be answered by this type of analysis. 
 
 Many of SKH’s findings are plausible and unremarkable.  It would be 
surprising if the divergence between converting and continuing societies had not 
begun before demutualization as it would have been reckless for those societies likely 
to convert to have done nothing to prepare for the ‘new world’ in which they would 
find themselves.  Similarly, continuing societies should surely have been less 
profitable than converting - they were driven by different motives. 
 
 The wave of demutualizations on which SKH focus was a step-change and 
removed most of the largest societies from the sector.  With hindsight, it is clear that 
these conversions shifted into the listed bank sector a number of institutions which 
were neither ‘fish nor foul’ - large societies which appeared to have the management 
ambition, scale and business skills to survive as listed banks, but in reality lacked 
some or all of these.  The message for the future, as the financial crisis has reinforced, 
is that the focus should be on better management in all financial institutions of 
whatever organizational form. 
 
 It will be interesting to see what role apparently unexciting mutual institutions 
such as building societies will have in the slow resolution of the financial crisis.  The 
largest remaining building societies appear committed to mutuality, but mutuals may 
become footnotes in financial history unless it is possible to establish new mutuals of 
significant size, or a mutual route is found to unwind the state ownership of large 
banks, or other existing institutions choose to adopt mutual form. 
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Table 1 
Britain’s demutualized building societies which became listed banks 
 
society year of 
demutualization 
subsequent fate 
Abbey National 1989 taken over by Banco Santander, 12 November 
2004 
Alliance and 
Leicester 
1997 taken over by Banco Santander, 10 October 
2008 
Bradford and 
Bingley 
2000 mortgage book nationalized on 29 September 
2008, with branches and savings book taken 
over by Banco Santander, 29 September 2008 
Halifax 1997 merged with Bank of Scotland to form HBOS, 
10 September 2001, then merged with Lloyds 
TSB plc, 19 January 2009, to form Lloyds 
Banking Group 
Northern Rock 1997 nationalized, 17 February 2008 
Woolwich 1997 taken over by Barclays plc, October 2000 
   
 
note: SKH’s analysis excludes Abbey National and Bradford and Bingley as their 
demutualizations did not take place in 1997. 
